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Abstract 
Do leaders of challenger parties adopt a ‘niche’ strategy in national televised debates?  
This paper answers this question by analysing the content of the two multiparty 
televised leaders’ debates that took place ahead of the 2015 British general election. 
Using computer-aided text analysis (CATA), it provides reliable and valid measures 
of what the leaders said in both debates and develops our theoretical understanding of 
how challenger-party leaders make their pitches. It finds that the UKIP, Green, SNP 
and Plaid Cymru leaders all demonstrated a degree of ‘nicheness’ in their 
contributions in comparison with the Conservative, Liberal Democrat and Labour 
leaders. It also finds that the challenger-party leaders placed a greater emphasis on 
their core concerns. Nevertheless, the debates covered much policy ground. Their 
structure obliged all party leaders to talk about mainstream issues. 
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Introduction 
The 2015 general election featured Britain’s first national multiparty televised 
leaders’ debate. Hosted by the broadcaster ITV, it brought together the Conservative 
prime minister David Cameron, the Liberal Democrat deputy prime minister Nick 
Clegg, Labour’s Ed Miliband, the United Kingdom Independence Party’s (UKIP) 
Nigel Farage, the Green Party’s Natalie Bennett, the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) 
Nicola Sturgeon and Plaid Cymru’s Leanne Wood. Two weeks later the BBC 
broadcast a five-way debate featuring Miliband, Farage, Bennett, Sturgeon and Wood. 
The 2015 debates were thus markedly different from those in 2010, when Cameron, 
Clegg and the then Labour prime minister Gordon Brown all took part in three 
contests (Bailey, 2012; Pattie and Johnston, 2011). While the earlier debates had been 
framed as ‘prime ministerial’ contests (Coleman, 2011; Benoit and Benoit-Bryan, 
2013), the 2015 debates could not be.1 Partly for this reason, they did not dominate 
the 2015 campaign as they had in 2010 (Bailey, 2012). Nevertheless, the 2015 debates 
were major campaign events. They were watched by millions of viewers and attracted 
significant media attention (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 286-287). What the leaders 
said in them mattered. 
In the wake of the 2010 debates, we analysed the leaders’ words and sought to 
develop our theoretical understanding of party behaviour in televised debates (Allen et 
al., 2013). This paper is partly a sequel to and partly an extension of that study. We 
again draw on theories of party competition to interpret the leaders’ words in 2015, 
and we again use computer-aided text analysis (CATA) to provide reliable and valid 
measures of the issues they emphasised. In this paper, however, we focus primarily on 
the words of the four challenger-party leaders: Farage, Bennett, Sturgeon and Wood. 
In particular, we examine the extent to which their contributions differed to those of 
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the mainstream-party leaders and how ‘niche’ they were in terms of the policy areas 
they emphasised (Meguid, 2005, 2008; Meyer and Miller, 2015).  
Our conceptual distinction between ‘challenger’ and ‘niche’ parties is 
important. Following De Vries and Hobolt (2012: 251), we define challenger parties 
in the context of Westminster elections as parties that have not previously held 
cabinet-level posts.2 Mainstream parties, in contrast, are those that have held national 
political office. By niche, we refer to a particular characteristic of some parties, a 
tendency to emphasise policy areas neglected by rivals (Meyer and Miller, 2015). To 
minimise confusion, we avoid using the term ‘mainstream’ when talking about 
parties’ issue emphases. While challenger parties are likely to pursue niche strategies 
in order to differentiate themselves from mainstream parties (De Vries and Hobolt, 
2012; Meyer and Wagner, 2013), they need not do so. Indeed, their choice of strategy 
may be complicated by regional dynamics: challenger parties in the context of 
national elections may be mainstream parties in the context of regional elections 
(McAngus, 2016). 
Our focus on the challenger parties in the 2015 debates is in no way meant to 
downplay the importance of the ‘prime ministerial’ contest between Cameron and 
Miliband. It simply reflects theoretical and practical considerations. There has been 
little research into how challenger parties behave in national televised debates. There 
is a particular need to develop relevant knowledge and theory in the context of the 
fragmenting British party system (Webb, 2000; Quinn, 2013; Brandenburg and Johns, 
2014). Given the general decline in the established major parties’ shares of the vote, it 
seems likely that challenger parties will be included in future debates. If their leaders 
address a relatively narrow range of issues, then broadcasters may need to adapt their 
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rules to meet their public-service objectives of informing and educating the electorate 
(Kuhn, 2007: 42–57). 
Focusing on the challenger parties also provides a necessary dose of analytical 
clarity for analysing both 2015 debates. The UKIP, Green, SNP and Plaid Cymru 
leaders were present in both contests. The incumbent prime minister and deputy prime 
minister, Cameron and Clegg, only participated in one. The leader of the opposition, 
Miliband, participated in both the ITV and BBC debates. His role shifted perceptibly, 
from being Cameron’s principal rival in the first debate to being the sole 
representative of the Westminster establishment in the second (Cowley and 
Kavanagh, 2015: 187). These changes complicate any analysis of the 2015 debates 
and raise more questions—such as the effect of the incumbents’ presence on other 
leaders’ behaviour—than can be answered here. These changes also mean that the 
contents of the two 2015 debates are not strictly comparable. For similar reasons, only 
limited comparisons can be made with the 2010 debates.  
We also recognise that the importance of televised debates rests on more than 
spoken words; viewers can also be swayed by visual images (Shephard and Johns, 
2012). Nevertheless, words communicate policy intentions. By systematically 
analysing what issues the leaders emphasised in 2015, we contribute to our knowledge 
and understanding of both the 2015 election leaders’ debates and broadcast debates 
more generally. By adapting Meyer and Miller’s (2015) measure of nicheness, we 
also demonstrate how methods that draw on manifesto data to analyse long-term 
programmatic competition can be used in conjunction with other sources of evidence, 
in this case debate transcripts, to analyse campaign behaviour. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section sets out the 
rules and structure of the debates and the wider political context. The third section 
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introduces theories of party competition and campaigning that can be used to interpret 
the leaders’ words in each debate. The fourth section introduces our data and two 
content-analytic methods, and the fifth reports our findings. The final section briefly 
evaluates the 2015 debates and discusses the implications of our findings.  
 
Why were there multiparty debates in 2015? 
The 2010 debates were not only the first in British electoral history; they also created 
an expectation that there would be similar contests in future (House of Lords 
Communications Committee, 2014). Yet, there was no guarantee that debates would 
take place in 2015. In the autumn of 2014, the BBC, ITV and Sky, who had organised 
the 2010 debates, now joined by Channel 4, wrote to David Cameron, Ed Miliband 
and Nick Clegg, as well as UKIP’s Nigel Farage, inviting them to participate in a 
series of three debates, to be held fortnightly over the course of the 2015 general 
election campaign. One of the proposed debates would be a two-way contest between 
Cameron and Miliband; another would be a three-cornered debate and included 
Clegg; and a third debate would be a four-cornered contest that would also include 
Farage. The inclusion of UKIP reflected the party’s growing electoral appeal and the 
broadcasters’ legal obligations.3 UKIP had won more votes than any other party in the 
2014 European Parliamentary elections, and the broadcasters correctly anticipated that 
it would be added to the regulator Ofcom’s (2015) list of ‘major’ parties, alongside 
the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats. 
It was touch and go during the ensuing negotiations whether or not a deal 
would be struck (see Bailey, 2017). Cameron eventually agreed to take part in a single 
debate with six other party leaders: Clegg, Milliband and Farage, plus the Greens’ 
Natalie Bennett, Plaid Cymru’s Leanne Wood and Nicola Sturgeon, the SNP leader 
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and Scotland’s first minister. ITV was the lucky broadcaster. The BBC made do with 
a five-way debate bringing together Miliband, Farage, Bennett, Wood and Sturgeon. 
Cameron also agreed to appear in two other special election programmes. He would 
be interviewed and answer audience questions in a Sky/Channel 4 production, as 
would Miliband. He would also take part in a special edition of the BBC’s Question 
Time with Miliband and Clegg. In both cases, however, the leaders would appear 
separately and not be able to challenge their opponents. There would thus be a series 
of election programmes but only two debates, and just one of these would bring 
together all the main party leaders. 
The outcome of the negotiations meant that the 2015 debates would be very 
different to those of five years earlier. The 2010 debates had followed a simple 
formula: three debates featuring all three major party leaders, each produced by a 
different broadcaster. The productions had also been partially coordinated, with each 
debate themed around a different topic—domestic affairs, international affairs and 
economics affairs respectively—and half the questions in each debate selected to 
reflect the relevant theme. There were only two debates in 2015, and they involved 
different sets of participants. There was also no thematic coordination across them. 
ITV and the BBC, the two broadcasters, retained full editorial independence over the 
choice of questions in their respective debates.  
The 2015 debates also differed from the 2010 debates, and from each other, in 
other respects. Each of the three-way debates in 2010 had been 90 minutes in duration 
and covered eight questions. The seven-way debate in 2015 lasted 120 minutes and 
covered just four questions. The five-way challenger’s debate lasted 90 minutes and 
included five questions. Fewer questions meant that, other things being equal, fewer 
issues could be addressed. The broadcasters responded by selecting questions that 
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bundled topics (summarised in Table 1). For example, the first question in ITV’s 
debate was:   
 
I would like to ask how do each of the party leaders believe they will be able 
to keep their promises of eliminating the deficit without raising certain taxes 
or making vast cuts to vital public services? 
 
Similarly, the first question selected for the BBC’s debate touched upon jobs, public 
spending and public debt: 
 
As someone about to enter the job market, is it fair to increase government 
spending like so many of you plan to do, when my generation will be left to 
pay off the debt? 
 
This bundling of issues gave the party leaders more freedom to emphasise issues. In 
the case of the first question, they could choose to say more about taxes or public 
services. In the case of the second, they could say more about jobs, spending or debt. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
As in 2010, the broadcasters gave participants up to 1 minute to respond to 
each question; but whereas in 2010 the leaders had been given a further minute to 
respond to the others’ answers, in 2015 they would launch straight into a moderated 
debate after one round of responses. This feature of the 2015 debates gave the leaders 
additional freedom to emphasise their preferred policy areas. Moreover, the 
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moderated-debate segments were lengthened to accommodate a greater number of 
participants. In 2010, the three leaders debated for 4 minutes after each question (36% 
of the total broadcast time). In the 2015 ITV debate, the seven leaders debated for 
around 18 minutes after each question (60% of the total broadcast time). In the 2015 
BBC debate, the five leaders debated for around 10 minutes after each question (56% 
of the total broadcast time). This rule again gave the leaders more freedom to 
emphasise their preferred policy areas than in 2010. 
 
Issues and niche parties 
Televised leaders’ debates can be framed in different ways. Depending on the 
participants, they may be framed as contests between prospective heads of 
government, contests between potentially ‘coalitionable’ parties (Sartori, 1976), or 
contests between parties fighting for votes in the same ideological space. All these 
frames were present in at least one of the two 2015 debates, but not all were present in 
both. The questions we might potentially ask, as well as what we can infer from the 
leaders’ words, are thus different for each debate.  
We sidestep these problems by specifying separate hypotheses for each debate 
and by framing our analysis around the four parties that were present in both of them: 
UKIP, the Greens, the SNP and Plaid Cymru. None of these parties had participated in 
the 2010 debates, nor had they ever held national political office. The SNP had, of 
course, held power in the Scottish Parliament since 2007, and Plaid Cymru had 
governed in coalition with Labour in the Welsh Assembly from 2007 to 2011. For this 
reason, they now arguably resemble mainstream parties, at least in the context of 
regional Scottish and Welsh electoral competition (McAngus, 2016). Nevertheless, 
they remained challenger parties in the context of the 2015 general election (De Vries 
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and Hobolt, 2012: 251). They also sought, like UKIP and the Greens, to challenge 
both the electoral dominance of the established mainstream parties and the established 
ways of British politics (Flinders, 2015: 244). 
The literature on party competition suggests that parties have three basic ways 
of enhancing their standing among the electorate. The first is by taking different 
‘positions’ on issues that involve disagreement about either core beliefs or specific 
policies (Downs, 1957). The second is by asserting their competence on ‘valence’ 
issues and their ability to achieve consensual outcomes, such as peace, prosperity, 
high-quality public services and security (Stokes, 1963). Yet, parties’ ability to assert 
their competence is constrained by objective truths, such as economic indicators, NHS 
waiting lists and immigration statistics (Green and Jennings, 2012). Moreover, 
people’s perceptions may be affected by the value they place on those outcomes.  
A related but nonetheless distinct way in which parties can enhance their 
standing among voters is by focussing attention on issues that provide them with 
electoral advantage. Challenger parties may benefit from mobilising conflict on new 
issue dimensions or wedge issues, and taking a clear position on them (De Vries and 
Hobolt, 2012; Van de Wardt et al., 2016). Mainstream parties may benefit from an 
enduring reputation for competence in certain policy areas, in line with theories of 
‘issue ownership’ (Budge and Farlie, 1983; Green and Hobolt, 2008). For example, 
the Conservatives have traditionally been regarded as the party of economic 
competence, Labour as the party of the public services (Newton, 1993). Ahead of the 
2015 debates, both parties’ reputations were pretty much at their usual levels: on 
average, across nine YouGov surveys conducted between January and April, the 
Conservatives enjoyed a 16-point lead over Labour in answer to the question of which 
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political party would best handle the economy. Labour enjoyed a 14-point lead over 
the Conservatives on the NHS.4 
Measuring issue emphasis in text is much more straightforward than deriving 
positions or identifying assertions of competence.5 Partly for this reason, and partly 
because we were interested in their policy-information value, our analysis of the 2010 
debates focused on the salience of key issues. We found limited evidence that leaders 
were able to emphasise those issues that advantaged them, in line with ownership 
theories (Allen et al., 2013). Brown, Cameron and Clegg did not consistently play to 
their issue strengths. This was partly because they were constrained by the rules, 
chiefly the question wording, and partly because they needed to show mastery across 
a range of issues in order to demonstrate their ability to be prime minister. 
The different format of the 2015 debates allows us to re-visit the question of 
which issues leaders focus on when taking part in televised debates. In particular, the 
involvement of UKIP, the Greens, the SNP and Plaid Cymru enables us to develop 
our theoretical understanding of how challenger-party leaders behave in debates. Our 
expectations are informed by the literature on niche parties (Meguid, 2005, 2008; 
Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow, 2008; Ezrow et al., 2010; Meyer and Miller, 2015; Zons, 
2016). These have been defined by their focus on issues that currently lie outside of 
the traditional left-right framework (Meguid, 2005, 2008) or those parties that ‘de-
emphasize economic concerns and stress a small range of non-economic issues’ 
(Wagner, 2012: 847). A more minimal definition is that ‘a niche party emphasizes 
those policy areas neglected by its competitors’ (Meyer and Miller, 2015: 260). 
The distinctiveness of a party’s policy emphasis can, of course, vary over time 
(Meyer and Wagner, 2013). It can also be affected by the strategic choices made by 
other parties in a system. Mainstream parties may take positions on previously 
 12 
neglected issues if they attract voters (Carmines and Stimson 1990), though they may 
face greater constraints on their ability to do so (Meyer and Wagner, 2013). When 
new issues are taken up by mainstream parties, they are incorporated into the existing 
left-right structure (Stimson, 2004). 
Instead of classifying parties categorically as being niche or not on the basis of 
their issue emphases, Meyer and Miller (2015) propose a continuous measure of 
nicheness that assesses the extent to which parties emphasise distinctive policy areas 
at any given point in time. It essentially averages a party’s deviation from the mean 
emphasis across all relevant policy areas. According to this logic, party p’s nicheness 
score (σ) is represented by the following formula, where N denotes the number of 
relevant issues or policy areas, p denotes the number of parties in a given party 
system, xip is party p’s emphasis on policy area i, and X̄i,– p is the average emphasis of 
all other parties on policy area i, weighted by party size: 
 
 
 
This score can then be standardised to enable direct comparison of all parties 
within the system: scores less than zero indicate a party is less niche than the average 
party, scores above zero indicate a party is more niche (Meyer and Miller, 2015: 263). 
The relevant formula, where μ – p represents the average nicheness of all other parties 
(excluding p) weighted by party size, is as follows: 
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Our first set of hypotheses reflects an expectation that the challenger-party 
leaders are likely to be relatively more niche across their overall contributions. On the 
basis of their broader programmes, UKIP, the Greens, the SNP and Plaid Cymru 
represent party families (hard Eurosceptic right, green and ethno-regionalist) usually 
categorised as niche, and all four parties have been identified as ‘niche’ parties in 
previous studies (Meguid, 2005, 2008; Lynch et al., 2012). Moreover, as challenger 
parties in the context of Westminster elections, they can be expected to focus on new 
issue dimensions (De Vries and Hobolt, 2012) or wedge issues (Van de Wardt, 2014), 
all of which are likely to be relatively neglected by the mainstream parties. Such a 
focus, in turn, is likely to contribute to their nicheness: 
 
H1a: In the ITV debate, the contributions of Farage (UKIP), Bennett (Green), 
Sturgeon (SNP) and Wood (Plaid Cymru) will have higher nicheness scores 
than the contributions of Cameron (Conservative), Clegg (Liberal Democrat) 
and Miliband (Labour). 
 
H1b: In the BBC debate, the contributions of Farage, Bennett, Sturgeon and 
Wood will have higher nicheness scores than the contributions Miliband. 
 
Our other hypotheses relate to the particular issues that the four challenger 
party leaders are likely to emphasise on the basis of their broader ideological 
commitments (Strøm, 1990; Budge, 1994). The defining issue for UKIP is withdrawal 
from the European Union. Their focus on Europe reaped limited electoral rewards in 
previous general elections. From 2013 onwards, however, UKIP bundled the 
European issue with immigration, an issue of increasing and intense public concern.6 
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The party’s electoral fortunes began to improve markedly (Goodwin and Milazzo, 
2015). UKIP’s central argument was that immigration could not be controlled while 
Britain remained a member of an EU that was committed to freedom of movement. 
The party’s campaign slogans hammered away at these issues: ‘Stop open door EU 
immigration: enough’s enough’. Accordingly, we would expect Farage to emphasise 
these issues: 
 
H2a: In the ITV debate, Farage emphasises Europe more than any other 
leader. 
 
H2b: In the BBC debate, Farage emphasises Europe more than any other 
leader. 
 
H3a: In the ITV debate, Farage emphasises immigration more than any other 
leader. 
 
H3b: In the BBC debate, Farage emphasises immigration more than any other 
leader. 
 
Ideological motivations also underpin our expectations about the Green Party. 
The natural environment, pollution and nuclear power are defining issues for the party 
(Carter, 2008). Responses to pollsters’ ‘most important issue’ (MII) questions 
suggested that this concern was not shared among the public in 2015.7 Nor was there 
any evidence that the Greens were advantaged on these issues or could gain electoral 
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advantage by highlighting them. Nevertheless, Bennett could be expected to appeal to 
Green Party members by emphasising environmental concerns: 
 
H4a: In the ITV debate, Bennett emphasises the environment more than any 
other leader. 
 
H4b: In the BBC debate, Bennett emphasises the environment more than any 
other leader. 
 
Our last issue-related hypotheses concern the strategies of the two nationalist 
parties, the SNP and Plaid Cymru. They both originated as vehicles to campaign for a 
different relationship with the rest of the United Kingdom, either home rule or, in the 
SNP’s case, ideally independence. Other things being equal, we would expect them to 
emphasise a range of constitutional issues, in particular the need for decentralisation, 
Scottish and Welsh distinctiveness and the failings of the Westminster system:8 
 
H5a: In the ITV debate, Sturgeon and Wood emphasise constitutional issues 
more than other leaders. 
 
H5b: In the BBC debate, Sturgeon and Wood emphasise constitutional issues 
more than other leaders. 
 
Data and methods 
The raw material for our analyses was the verbatim transcripts of the two debates. 
These were prepared by two of the authors using recordings of the debates and then 
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checked against the recordings by a third author. Table 2 reports the total number of 
words spoken by each leader in each debate.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The transcripts were analysed using Computer Assisted Text Analysis 
(CATA), specifically HAMLET II software (Brier and Hopp, n.d.). HAMLET II 
enables users to analyse word frequencies across texts, identify key words and create 
dedicated vocabularies around those words. It also enables users to break downs texts 
into sections—such as leaders’ responses to questions or their opening and closing 
statements in debates—for separate analysis, and to designate coding units, such as 
paragraphs or sentences. For our analysis, the coding units were quasi-sentences (see 
Budge et al., 2001: 96), short passages delimited by standard punctuation conventions 
whether commas, semicolons or full stops. No content-analytic method is entirely free 
of all bias, but CATA reduces human intervention, making the measures extremely 
reliable (Bara et al., 2007). Moreover, since we code the transcripts according to 
clearly established rules, readers can easily identify any potential biases.  
Measuring issue emphasis was essentially a matter of counting how many 
quasi-sentences were associated with particular policy areas. This was done through 
HAMLET II, which enables users to define coding categories and build lists of related 
words, including appropriate synonyms, abbreviations and word-strings. The software 
then uses these lists to identify automatically all quasi-sentences that contain at least 
one relevant entry. Each quasi-sentence can only be counted once under the same 
category but, depending on the words found, may be counted multiple times under 
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multiple categories. The results are then reported by category as a percentage of all 
quasi-sentences so counted. 
Our coding categories were informed by both our hypotheses and the 
responses given in various MII questions posed by the British Election Study, 
YouGov and Ipsos MORI in the spring of 2015.9 Together, these responses covered a 
wide range of issues that mattered ahead of the election. Since the three organizations 
employed slightly different response categories, we merged some in order to produce 
a consistent set. A few of our categories, such as culture and transport, were discarded 
after preliminary analysis revealed they did not feature in the debates. Our analysis 
ultimately employed 17 categories. With one exception, each of these had its own 
exclusive list of entries. The exception was the category austerity. Since this issue 
touched upon economic considerations and the health of the public services, its list 
had to include words that overlapped with other categories. 
 
Results 
Tables 3 and 4 display the full results of our analysis of the ITV seven-way leaders’ 
debate and the BBC five-way leaders’ debate respectively. Each table reports the 
relative salience of our 17 categories in every leader’s overall contribution, as well as 
in the debate as a whole. The final three rows report three aggregations of policy 
areas: a total economy measure, which reports the combined salience of economy, 
jobs and tax; a total public services measure, which combines education and health; 
and a total security measure, which aggregates law and order, defence, Europe, 
foreign affairs and immigration. These aggregations correspond broadly with three 
distinctive dimensions of political competition in contemporary Britain, a point we 
return to. 
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TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The full results show that, in both debates, the party leaders emphasised a wide 
range of issues. The results also show that some categories were more sparsely 
populated than others. Among the individual categories, constitution (16%), health 
(14%), economy (10%), jobs (10%) and education (8%) were the five most-salient in 
the whole of ITV debate, while constitution (18%), housing (12%), foreign affairs 
(9%), economy (8%) and defence (8%) were the five-most salient categories in the 
BBC debate. To a large extent, these differences reflect the questions posed by the 
broadcasters. In the ITV debate, there were separate questions that explicitly referred 
to education and health, while the BBC debate included questions that explicitly 
addressed defence and housing (see Table 1). When the policy areas were aggregated, 
total economy (26%) was clearly the most salient in the first debate, ahead of total 
public services (22%) and total security (18%), while total security (24%) led total 
economy (18%) and total public services (9%) in the second debate. Again, these 
differences largely reflect the respective questions. 
Turning to our specific hypotheses in respect of challenger parties, Table 5 
reports the standardised nicheness scores for all party leaders participating in the 
debates. In order to calculate these scores, we followed the formulae presented by 
Meyer and Miller (2015). We measured party size on the basis of the proportion of 
words spoken by each leader in the relevant debate (see Table 2).10 This enabled us to 
measure the nicheness of the various leaders’ contributions in the specific context of 
each debate.  
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TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results are largely consistent with H1a and H1b. In the first debate, we 
expected Farage, Bennett, Sturgeon and Wood to have positive scores, which would 
indicate their issue emphasis was more niche than average. With the exception of 
Bennett, this was indeed the case, although the magnitude of the Green leader’s 
negative score (-0.3) indicates that, while she was less niche than average, she was 
still more so than Cameron, Clegg and Miliband. In the second debate, which featured 
only one established major party, we expected Miliband to have the lowest score. The 
results indicate that his overall contribution was less niche than average (-0.7), but the 
SNP’s Nicola Sturgeon (-0.8) was even less niche this debate. Plaid Cymru’s Leanne 
Wood (-0.5) was also less niche than average in the context of the second debate, 
although not as much so as Miliband. Overall, then, the results confirm that the 
challenger parties were generally more niche in their contributions, but they also 
suggest that the presence or absence of incumbents may have had some effect on the 
relative nicheness of Britain’s ethno-regionalist parties in particular. 
Table 5 also includes, for the sake of comparison, the parties’ nicheness scores 
in the wider British party system. Following Meyer and Miller (2015), these scores 
are based on 2015 Manifesto Project (MARPOR) data and the parties’ share of the 
vote in the 2015 general election (Volkens et al., 2015). Their general consistency 
with the nicheness scores for the debates provides face validity for our analysis. The 
challenger parties were generally more niche in their policy emphases than the 
established parties. The notable exception was the SNP: its programme was less niche 
than average, in line with Sturgeon’s words in the BBC debate if not the ITV debate. 
Indeed, these scores provide further support for the claim that the SNP increasingly 
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resembles a mainstream party (McAngus, 2016). They also raise intriguing questions 
about how a party’s changing status in the context of regional government may 
influence its appeal and strategy in the context of national elections. 
Our remaining hypotheses concerned the emphasis that the challenger party 
leaders placed on those policy areas that relate most strongly to their parties’ 
programmes. For UKIP, we expected Farage to emphasise the issues of Europe and 
immigration more than the other leaders. The data in Tables 3 and 4 provide evidence 
to support H2a and H2b, but not H3a and H3b. His Europe salience measures (12% 
and 18% respectively) were comfortably the highest among all leaders in both 
debates. His immigration scores (6% and 4%) were not. Indeed, a greater proportion 
of Bennett’s and Wood’s contributions in the first debate (8% and 7%), and Bennett’s 
and Sturgeon’s in the second (6% and 8%), were devoted to the issue of immigration. 
This prominence was largely a reflection of these leaders’ distinctly ‘adversarial’ 
response towards Farage’s anti-immigration line (Meguid, 2005).11 However, our data 
also reveal a heavy emphasis on foreign affairs in the UKIP leader’s contributions, 
which often took the form of promises to reclaim sovereignty and control. Farage’s 
scores for foreign affairs (17% and 15%) were the highest for this category, while his 
total security scores (37% and 46%), which also include law and order and defence, 
were also the highest. Much of UKIP’s appeal rests on assertions of external threats 
and the promise of security by raising the ‘drawbridge’ (Quinn, 2006). 
In terms of the Green Party, H4a and H4b predicted that Bennett would 
emphasise the environment more than any other leader. The relevant scores for the 
environment category in Tables 3 and 4 are in complete accord with both hypotheses. 
No other leader came close to emphasising the issue as prominently as Bennett in 
either the ITV (8%) or BBC debate (10%). She made a pitch for Green votes despite 
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the lack of an obvious cue in any of the questions, for instance, talking about climate 
change and mass extinctions in response to ITV’s last question on young people’s 
futures, and protecting Britain’s ‘natural environment’ in response to the BBC’s 
fourth question on immigration (see Table 1). 
Lastly, in terms of Plaid Cymru and the SNP, H5a and H5b predicted that 
Wood and Sturgeon would emphasise what we term constitutional issues more than 
the other leaders. Again, the evidence from Tables 3 and 4 bears this out. In both the 
ITV and BBC debates, constitution received more attention in Wood’s (31% and 
25%) and Sturgeon’s contributions (24% and 20%) than in those of any party leader. 
The prominence of the issue in Wood’s contributions is especially striking.  
While our hypotheses were concerned primarily with the challenger-party 
leaders, it is also worth reflecting on the prominence that the other party leaders gave 
to issues. One of the striking findings from Table 3 is that they notably higher in their 
emphasis on total economy and total public services than the challenger-party leaders. 
When the contributions of Cameron, Miliband and Clegg, and Farage, Bennett, 
Sturgeon and Wood are aggregated and analysed (not shown in Table 3), the 
established major parties’ total economy score is 31%, compared with 20% for the 
challenger parties; and their combined total public services score is 25%, compared 
with 18%. Overall, these numbers reveal how political debate at Westminster, at least 
defined on the basis of mainstream-party competition, continues to be a matter of ‘the 
economy plus public services, stupid’ (Crewe, 2001). 
Although it was not our intention, our findings also provide some support for 
issue-ownership theories, particularly in terms of what Cameron chose to emphasise. 
Economic issues were notably salient in Cameron’s contributions in the ITV debate, 
as shown for the scores for economy (10%), tax (12%) and jobs (12%). Likewise his 
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total economy score (34%) was the highest of any leader in either debate. These 
findings are in accord with the Conservatives’ electoral strategy in 2015. They led 
Labour as the best party on the economy, as seen, while their campaign posters 
rammed home a message of relative competence: ‘Let’s stay on the road to a stronger 
economy’, and ‘A recovering economy; don’t let Labour ruin it’. Miliband, by 
contrast, did not speak about the public services as much as might have been expected 
given Labour’s traditional affinity for them. Miliband’s emphasis scores for health 
(18%) and total public services (25%) were only marginally greater than Cameron’s 
(17% and 24% respectively). They were also less than Clegg’s (21% and 28%), who 
may have been seeking to put some distance between himself and his coalition 
partner, Cameron, by emphasising his party’s commitment to public services. 
As a final test of hypotheses H2a to H5b, we also analysed the leaders’ 
opening and closing statements in each debate. These sections were unconstrained by 
questions and interactions with other participants. They invited all leaders to be niche, 
at least for a moment, by enabling them to focus on their ‘ideal’ pitch to viewers.12 If 
we expect challenger parties to emphasise their defining issues across debates, we 
would expect such an emphasis to be especially pronounced in the opening and 
closing statements. 
 
TABLES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Tables 6 and 7 report the results of the CATA analyses. The brevity of the 
opening and closing statements means the data should be approached with some 
caution, but they provide further support for our general findings. Farage’s scores for 
Europe (13% and 5%) and especially immigration (13% and 11%) were greater than 
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any other leaders’ in both the ITV and BBC debates, Bennett’s environment scores 
(19% and 27%) were relatively greater still, and both Sturgeon (49% and 41%)  and 
Wood (75% and 33%) comfortably outscored the others on constitution. The data in 
Table 6 also confirm the apparent tendency for the established major parties to focus 
more than insurgent parties on the traditional bread-and-butter issues of the economy 
and the public services. And as the relevant total economy score (64%) shows, no one 
watching the first debate could have missed Cameron’s attempt to reassure voters 
about his party’s ‘long-term economic plan’. 
 
Discussion 
After much uncertainty, two national televised leaders’ debates were held ahead of the 
2015 British general election. They were multiparty affairs rather than the obviously 
prime ministerial contests of 2010. Indeed, the incumbent prime minister only 
participated in one of them. 
In this paper, we applied CATA to transcripts of both the ITV and BBC 
debates to summarise the participants’ words and to develop our theoretical 
understanding of how party leaders behave. Because of the debates’ multiparty 
format, and because they featured a changing cast, we framed our analysis around the 
challenger parties. We found that Farage, Bennett, Sturgeon and Wood—the leaders 
of UKIP, the Greens, the SNP and Plaid Cymru respectively—demonstrated to 
varying degrees a relatively high degree of nicheness in their contributions. We also 
found that these parties emphasised their core concerns in line with expectations. 
It is, of course, impossible to ascertain whether the challenger parties’ 
presence in the 2015 debates distorted the balance of issues covered. Since there were 
no debates involving just the traditional major parties, we cannot know what the effect 
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of debating with Farage, Bennett, Sturgeon and Wood had on the issue emphases of 
Cameron, Clegg and Miliband. What is clear, however, is that the debates covered 
much policy ground. As with the 2010 debates, the rules of the game obliged the 
leaders to address a range of substantive issues. The leaders had to respond to the 
questions, even if they felt themselves to be at a disadvantage. Among the mainstream 
parties, this requirement was especially pronounced. In issue or policy terms, the 
debates did not become hijacked by minority concerns. Given the number of 
participants in both debates and the range of policy priorities they represented, the 
broadcasters arguably did a good job in their choice of questions and in their 
moderation of the debates. 
While it was not the primary focus of the paper, this last point highlights the 
limits of applying salience theory to the analysis of leaders’ debates, or at least to the 
words of mainstream party leaders. In an earlier study, we found that issue ownership 
did not help to predict the behaviour of party leaders (Allen et al., 2013). In our 
analysis of the 2015 debates, we again found little evidence that the major party 
leaders acted as if they ‘owned’ certain issues. At the very least, the language of 
‘ownership’ with its connotation of exclusive possession does not seem entirely 
appropriate for understanding the dynamics of leaders’ debates. In the ITV debate, 
Cameron did not act as if he thought he had nothing to say about health, education or 
housing, and Miliband did not act as if he had nothing of value to say on the economy, 
immigration or Europe. Both leaders had much to say about issues that arguably 
advantaged their principal rivals.  
Moreover, the 2015 leaders’ debates, like all debates, demonstrated how, in 
political campaigning, politicians bundle together issues or try to change the 
dimensionality of an argument. To some extent they were helped by the broadcasters’ 
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choice of questions, but in response to almost every question, all the leaders to 
varying degrees behaved heresthetically (Riker, 1986). Cameron countered every 
attack on his record on the public services with the proposition that increased 
spending was only possible because the economy was growing. Farage used questions 
about the deficit and the NHS to attack the European Union and levels of migration. 
Bennett highlighted the environment where possible. Debates are ultimately based on 
the proposition that those with the better arguments win. They have to be approached 
on the basis that participants will say something about almost everything. Focusing on 
issue emphasis can only get us so far.  
Finally, while our findings relate only to a small set of parties and a single 
case, they do suggest that challenger parties, representing a range of ideological 
traditions, tend to pursue niche strategies in televised election debates. Further 
research is clearly needed to establish whether other types of challenger parties in 
other political systems behave similarly. At the same, our findings also suggest that 
challenger-party leaders vary in how much they emphasise policy areas neglected by 
their rivals when debating. This last point provides further support for the contention 
that party nicheness should be viewed as a continuous rather than a dichotomous 
variable (Meyer and Miller, 2015). On close inspection, there is rarely if ever such a 
thing as a pure single-issue niche party. Moving beyond such categories is essential if 
we are to develop our theoretical understanding of election debates and political 
campaigning more generally. 
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Notes
                                                 
1 Only Cameron, the incumbent, and Miliband, the leader of the opposition, had a 
plausible expectation of being able to do so after the election. 
2 In the British context, the term ‘insurgent party’ is often used as a synonym for 
challenger party (Curtice, 2014; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015: 13). 
3 In particular, section 319 (2) (c) of Communications Act 2003 and section 44 of The 
Agreement accompanying the BBC Charter 2006, required news to be presented with 
‘due impartiality’. 
4 Averaging across surveys irons out the periodic fluctuations and produces a more 
reliable estimate of importance. The monthly data are reported in YouGov (2015a).  
5 See Laver et al. (2003) for a method of inferring positions from text and Lowe 
(2008) for a discussion of the necessary conditions for this method to be valid. 
6 Across nine YouGov (2015b) surveys conducted between January and April 2015, 
some 50% of respondents on average selected ‘immigration’ as one of three ‘most 
important issues facing the country’. 
7 Across nine YouGov (2015b) surveys conducted between January and April 2015, 
just 8% of respondents on average selected ‘environment’ as one of three most 
important issues. 
8 Our ‘constitutional’ category also includes general appeals to Scotland and Wales. 
While these could be viewed simply as appeals to the economic interests of the 
regions, we regard them as being constitutional given the centrality of national 
autonomy to the two parties’ programmes.  
9 The British Election Study categories came from Wave 5 of its 2014-2017 Internet 
Panel, in particular the responses of a ‘core sample’ intended for cross-sectional 
analysis. The question was: ‘As far as you’re concerned, what is the SINGLE MOST 
 27 
                                                                                                                                            
important issue facing the country at the present time?’ The YouGov categories came 
from nine surveys fielded between January and April 2015. The question was: ‘Which 
of the following do you think are the most important issues facing the country at this 
time? Please tick up to three’. The Ipsos MORI categories were drawn from its ‘Issues 
Index April 2015’. The question was: ‘What would you say is the most important 
issue facing Britain today?’  
10 These proportions themselves reflected editorial decisions and attempts by the 
broadcasters to allocate airtime in some degree of proportion to parties’ electoral and 
political significance. 
11 Whereas the Tories and Labour both feared losing votes to UKIP over this issue 
(Cowley and Kavangh, 2016: 52-56, 86-88), the other challenger parties did not. Any 
increase in the salience of immigration was unlikely to hurt their support. As a result, 
Bennett, Sturgeon and Wood were perhaps more willing to tackle this issue head on. 
12 The likelihood that all leaders are likely to focus very narrowly on a small range of 
issues in their opening and closing statements makes it problematic to apply Meyer 
and Wagner’s nicheness measure to just these parts of the debate. Since mainstream-
party leaders are just as likely as challenger-party leaders to focus on a small range of 
key issues in their opening and closing statements, they will, by definition, neglect a 
large number of other issues. For example, Cameron’s intense focus on the economy 
in his opening and closing statements in the ITV debate (see Table 6) gave him a very 
high niche score (4.3), second only to Leanne Wood (6.2). Other than confirming that 
Cameron’s narrow focus on the economy set him apart from the others in the opening 
and closing statements, it would be stretching the concept somewhat to suggest that he 
was adopting a ‘niche’ strategy in doing so. 
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TABLE 1: The issues covered by the 2015 questions 
 
Debate Question number Topics covered 
ITV seven-way leaders’ debate 
2 April 2015 
1 Deficit, taxation, public 
services 
 2 The NHS, taxation 
 3 Immigration, Europe 
 4 Youth, education, 
pensions, public debt, 
housing 
BBC five-way leaders’ debate 
16 April 2015 
1 Government spending, 
public debt, jobs, youth 
 2 Housing, social housing 
 3 Defence, Trident 
 4 Immigration, public 
services 
 5 Post-election deals 
 
 
 35 
TABLE 2: The leaders’ verbal contributions to the 2015 debates 
 
  ITV debate BBC debate 
Leader  Party N % N % 
Cameron Con 4,105 20.4 --- --- 
Clegg Lib Dem 3,120 15.5 --- --- 
Miliband Lab 3,670 18.2 4,005 29.8 
Farage UKIP 2,721 13.5 2,682 19.9 
Bennett Green 2,196 10.9 2,370 17.6 
Sturgeon SNP 2,615 13.0 2,638 19.6 
Wood PC 1,702 8.5 1,765 13.1 
Total  20,129 100 13,460 100 
 
 
 36 
TABLE 3: Issue salience (% of contributions) in ITV’s seven-way leaders’ debate 
 
Issue category Cameron Clegg Miliband Farage Bennett Sturgeon Wood 
Whole 
debate 
Austerity 6 6 4 6 7 10 14 7 
Constitution 8 12 13 11 11 24 31 16 
Law and order 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Defence 1 1 1 1 1 3 0 1 
Economy 10 11 6 10 13 11 8 10 
Education 7 7 7 8 9 8 4 8 
Environment 0 0 1 0 8 0 1 1 
Europe 7 5 4 12 6 3 8 6 
Family 3 4 3 1 2 3 0 2 
Foreign affairs 3 4 4 17 5 3 3 5 
Health 17 21 18 10 10 10 13 14 
Housing 2 3 3 2 2 5 0 3 
Immigration 5 6 3 6 8 3 7 5 
Inequality 1 4 4 3 5 0 1 2 
Tax 12 4 9 3 3 5 0 6 
Jobs 12 12 17 5 7 7 8 10 
Welfare 4 1 1 2 1 5 2 2 
         
Total economy 34 27 32 18 23 23 17 26 
Total public services 24 28 25 18 19 18 17 22 
Total security 17 17 13 37 21 12 18 18 
 
Percentages have been rounded to the nearest integer.
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TABLE 4: Issue salience (% of contributions) in the BBC’s five-way leaders’ debate 
 
Issue category Miliband Farage Bennett Sturgeon Wood Whole debate 
Austerity 5 6 5 8 9 6 
Constitution 19 13 10 20 25 18 
Law and order 0 0 0 1 2 1 
Defence 7 9 7 13 7 8 
Economy 3 11 10 7 10 8 
Education 2 1 2 3 0 2 
Environment 2 0 10 0 0 3 
Europe 3 18 2 2 1 1 
Family 3 0 1 3 1 2 
Foreign affairs 8 15 8 11 6 9 
Health 11 3 7 5 7 8 
Housing 13 7 15 15 13 12 
Immigration 3 4 6 8 4 5 
Inequality 3 3 4 0 2 2 
Tax 8 4 1 1 3 3 
Jobs 9 3 8 4 8 7 
Welfare 2 1 4 2 2 2 
       
Total economy 20 18 19 11 22 18 
Total public services 13 4 9 8 7 9 
Total security 21 46 23 34 19 24 
 
Percentages have been rounded to the nearest integer. 
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TABLE 5: Standardised nicheness scores for the party leaders 
 
 Party ITV debate BBC debate MARPOR 
Cameron Con -0.6 --- -1.0 
Clegg Lib Dem -1.2 --- 0.3 
Miliband Lab -0.5 -0.7  -0.7 
Farage UKIP 1.2 1.9 1.7 
Bennett Green -0.3 0.2 6.1 
Sturgeon SNP 0.4 -0.8 -0.5 
Wood PC 2.2 -0.5 2.8 
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TABLE 6: Issue salience (% of contributions) in the leaders’ opening and closing statements in the ITV debate 
 
Issue category Cameron Clegg Miliband Farage Bennett Sturgeon Wood 
Europe 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 
Immigration 0 0 0 13 3 0 0 
Environment 0 0 8 0 19 0 5 
Constitution 0 33 20 25 35 49 75 
        
Total economy 64 39 40 25 14 19 10 
Total public services 6 11 28 0 8 3 0 
Total security 15 0 0 44 3 11 0 
 
Percentages have been rounded to the nearest integer. 
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TABLE 7: Issue salience (% of contributions) in the leaders’ opening and closing statements in the BBC debate 
 
Issue category Miliband Farage Bennett Sturgeon Wood 
Europe 3 5 3 0 0 
Immigration 0 11 0 0 0 
Environment 3 0 27 0 0 
Constitution 7 16 17 41 33 
      
Total economy 34 47 17 21 29 
Total public services 24 0 10 10 5 
Total security 7 37 3 7 5 
 
Percentages have been rounded to the nearest integer. 
 
 
